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Abstract
The underpricing of initial public offerings is a well-documented phenomenon in the financial
literature. The purpose of this paper is to show how this empirical regularity could be solved by an
appropriate choice of financing instruments, namely, by an intelligent mix of common stocks and put
options. The latter additional instrument, modeled in this paper as a lump sum paid by insiders of the
firm to outsiders, helps alleviate the asymmetry of information existing between insiders and outsiders
of the corporation, allowing good firms to sell the package they offer at the full information value.
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The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) is a well-documented phenomenon in
the financial literature. Several studies have reported that underwriters of IPOs achieve
abnormal returns in the very short term, suggesting that IPOs may be underpriced. For the
U.S. market, Ibbotson et al. (1988) find an average return of about 16%.1
On the theoretical side, scholars in finance have tried to justify the underpricing of IPOs
as an equilibrium phenomenon and not as a consequence of the inefficiency of the capital
market in general, and of the IPOs market in particular. In Baron (1982), underpricing
emerges as an equilibrium in a model of agency. In his model, underwriters have better
information about the right price for the IPOs because they have better knowledge of the
tastes and risk characteristics of the investors. Underwriters, however, have incentives to set
a lower price for the equity because this will attract more investors, will facilitate the0929-1199/$ - see front matter D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1 The same phenomenon has been detected in other countries. For a comprehensive review of the findings,
see Loughran et al. (1994).
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with an unsuccessful offer. Rock (1986) presents a model based on asymmetric information
across investors, and presents a theory that relies on a well-established result in the theory of
auctions: the winner’s curse. In his model, underpricing results as compensation to attract
uninformed investors. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) present a generalization of Leland and
Pyle (1977) in which risk-averse issuers use the proportion of equity retained and the price
of the issue to signal the mean and the risk of their projects. Other signaling models include
work by Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989). In Chemmanur (1993), under-
pricing arises in equilibrium by the willingness to induce information production about the
firm. An auction theoretical model is developed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
The purpose of this paper is to show how the underpricing occurring in IPOs could be
mitigated or solved by giving firms the possibility of attaching an option-like claim to the
portion of the equity they sell. The put option, modeled in this paper as a lump sum paid by
the insiders of the firm to the new stockholders in some selected states, helps reduce the
asymmetry of information existing between insiders and outsiders, allowing good firms, as
specified later on in the paper, to sell the package they offer at the full information value.2
This paper it is related to the work of Leland and Pyle (1977) and to that part of the
literature that considers the underpricing phenomenon in IPOs as a way to communicate
quality between informed firms and investors (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and
Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989). In our set-up, borrowed from Chemmanur and Fulghieri
(1997), risk-averse entrepreneurs have to finance a positive net present value project by
raising the funds from outsiders. There are for simplicity just two types of projects
characterized by different values of means and risk parameters. In a model with asymmetric
information, these differences make it problematic to price equity. If no instruments were
available to signal the quality of the project, the only price of the equity to which the insider
of the firm would be able to sell his project would be a pooling price.
In this paper, we give insiders the possibility of signaling their type to outsiders by the
choice of the amount of equity retained as in Leland and Pyle (1977), by the choice of the
price of the package they offer as in Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and by the choice of
attaching to the equity offering a lump sum (put-like claim) to be paid to the outsiders in the
case of the bad state. This paper looks, in some sense, at the other side of the coin with
respect to the work of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997). In the latter paper, the authors
show how high-risk firms issue unit IPOs, a package of equity and warrants, to signal
quality, and how firms optimally choose underpricing as a part of the efficient signaling
mix. In this paper, we use basically the same framework, and we extend their model to
tackle a different issue. The main result of the present paper is that when insiders of the
corporation can use freely the three instruments described above, for some values of the
parameter space, namely, when the risk parameter of the signaling firm is relatively low,
underpricing is not part of the efficient signaling mix. That is, packaging equity and put
option-like claims help good firms set the price of the package at the full information value.
Through the put, the risk stemming from the asymmetry of information would shift from the
outsider shareholders to the entrepreneur, allowing, for some parameter space, the latter to2 Chen and Kensinger (1988) tackle this issue. Their paper, however, only illustrates the idea and does not
consider the conditions that determine the optimality of the package.
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behind the result is that the lump sum turns out to be cheaper for those firms whose risk
parameters are lower. This comparative advantage helps good firms to signal their quality
more easily, relaxing the additional requirements that were otherwise necessary to obtain
separation. The implications stemming from this paper are in line with the recent empirical
findings by Prabhala and Puri (1998) who examine a sample of firms whose underwriters
supported the price around the IPO. They claim that price support can be seen as a put
option written by the underwriters to the new shareholders, and they find that consistent
with the main predictions of the present paper, (a) price support significantly reduces
underpricing3 and (b) underwriters stabilize the price only for those firms whose ex ante
measures of uncertainty were lower.
Finally, this paper is also closely related to the work of Brennan and Kraus (1987). They
show in fact that despite the asymmetry of information, the investment opportunities may
be efficiently financed by an appropriate choice of financing instruments that reveals
private proprietary information to outsiders. This implies that when the adverse selection is
severe, plain financial strategies may not constitute the efficient financing choice. Although
the initial offering stage seems to be a moment that, due to the asymmetry of information, is
potentially harmful for the entrepreneur’s wealth, little effort has been done to determine
which choice of financing is optimal at the IPO stage.4 In this sense, we find that common
stocks may not be the optimal financing choice of the corporation and that a less standard
choice of securities could help the firm to credibly signal its quality to outsiders.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the model and describes the
economy. Section 2 tackles the problem faced by entrepreneurs under the hypothesis of
perfect information. Section 3 introduces the equilibrium concept used and describes the
additional problems faced by the entrepreneur under asymmetric information.We will begin
by assuming that the insider of the good firm (type G firm) may use as signals only the
percentage of equity retained, or the percentage of equity retained and the value of the
package he offers. In Section 4, we solve themore general problem faced by the insider when
he can freely use not only the two instruments introduced above, but also a put-option-like
claim. Additionally, other potential applications such as SEOs and privatizations are
discussed. Section 5 presents some comparative statics. Section 6 concludes the paper.1. The model
Consider two points in time. At time t= 0, risk-averse entrepreneurs take their private
firms public by selling equity to risk-neutral outsiders. The total number of shares is4 Notable exceptions to this approach are the papers by Biais et al. (in press) and Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet
(in press). These papers, keeping as given the securities issued by the entrepreneur, consider different offering
methods and derive the optimal mechanism. Note that, however, even under the optimal mechanism, underpricing
emerges in equilibrium.
3 The put option, as modeled in this paper, is a more explicit and, therefore, a more credible commitment
device. Remember in fact that the law requires underwriters to disclose the possibility of price support in the IPO
prospect. Ex post, only a fraction of those IPOs will be actually supported. This can explain why, even with price
support, there may be a difference between the IPO offer and the after-market price.
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simplicity that the interest rate is zero and that the firms are either good (G) or bad (B).
Each project has a cost k and a positive NPV. The cash flows are characterized by a three-
point distribution such as: ls rs/pL, ls, ls + rs/pH, where sa{G, B}, lG>lB and ls rs/
pL>0. The probabilities attached to each state (low, medium and high) are, respectively,
pL, pM and pH. At t= 1, the cash flows of the projects are realized. Insiders know their
own type, namely, mean ls and risk parameter rs, but not which state will be realized at
t= 1. Outsiders, however, do not know which firm is of what type.
The put option will be modeled in the paper as a lump sum, denoted Ds, that will be paid
by the insiders of the firms to the outsiders should the bad state occur. Thus, for a given
retained proportion of the equity a, the payoff accruing to the outsiders of the firm will be
either (1 a)(ls rs/pL +Ds), (1 a)ls or (1 a)(ls + rs/pH) for state low, medium or
high, respectively.
We further assume that risk-averse insiders have a negative exponential utility function
with risk parameter C. The insider has wealth at the beginning of the period equal to w0 that
is invested in some other asset and cannot be used to finance the current investment (in
other words, the entrepreneur is financially constrained and has to raise in the market
whatever funds the firm needs).
In such an environment, pricing the equity can be problematic. Statements by the insider
regarding the quality of the firm are cheap and can be passed by. The problem of the insider
of the good firm is, therefore, to choose some instruments to credibly signal his firm’s
quality. We tackle the problem in different steps in order to highlight the trade-offs involved
in the analysis.2. The insider’s problem under perfect information
Denote by VG(a, DG), the full information value of the proceeds of the IPO for the type
G firm. These are equal to the expected value of the stream of the payoffs accruing to the
buyer of the IPO under full information. Since risk-neutral outsiders price claims at their
expected value, if the insider sells (1 a) of the firm, the proceeds of the IPO are given
by:
VGða;DGÞ ¼ ð1 aÞðlG þ pLDGÞ ð1Þ
Define ws
s as the time 1 wealth of the insider of the type s firm in state s (s =L, M, H).
In the different states, this is given by the following equations:
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max
a;DG;V
E½Uðw˜1Þ ¼ eCw˜1 ¼ pLeCw˜GL  pMeCw˜GM  pHeCw˜GH
subject to
VVVGða;DGÞ
ð1 aÞDGVaðlG  rG=pLÞ
V  kz0
with 0V aV 1, Vz 0, DGz 0.
Insiders want to maximize their end of period wealth, subject to some constraints. The
first constraint is a rational individual constraint: no investor would be willing to pay more
for the package than it is worth under full information. The second constraint is a basic
credibility constraint: the entrepreneur must have the appropriate amount of funds to
finance the payment of the put option in the bad state. The logic behind limiting the wealth
of the entrepreneur to the stream of payoffs coming from the investment relies on limited
liability and on the relative inability of the new shareholders to attack the entrepreneur’s
wealth. The third constraint states that the funds raised in the IPO stage must be such as to
fully finance the project. The other constraints are self-evident and are not discussed.
Proposition 1 (Chemmanur–Fulghieri). With symmetric information, as*= 0 and Ds*= 0,
maximize the objective of both firms, and the prices of the equity for the good and the bad
firm are, respectively, lG and lB.
The proof is left to the reader. The intuition is easy to grasp. The entrepreneur in this
framework does not have any informational advantage and is risk-averse. Being risk-
averse, he, thus, finds it optimal to sell all the projects to the outsiders who pay a fair price
for the claim they buy.3. Equilibrium under asymmetric information
Under asymmetric information, insiders of the type G firm may find it optimal to
distinguish their firm from the type B firm. We restrict our attention to separating equilibria
where the type G firm structures the IPO so as to impose on the type B firm trying to mimic
such a high cost that the type B firm prefers to be revealed as it is. Thus, equilibrium
strategies and beliefs are defined as those that constitute a separating sequential equilibrium
as defined by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986). Henceforth,
denote Us(a, Ds, V) as the expected utility for type s insider. The equilibrium emerges as the
solution to the following problem faced by type G firms:max
a;DG;V
UGða;DG;V Þ ð2Þ
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UBða;DG;V ÞVUðlBÞ ð3Þ
VVVGða;DGÞ ð4Þ
ð1 aÞDGVaðlG  rG=pLÞ ð5Þ
DGVrG=pL ð6Þ
V  kz0 ð7Þ
and 0V aV 1, Vz 0, DGz 0.
Eq. (3) is an incentive compatibility constraint: it states that the expected utility to the
type B firm under mimicking, denoted as UB(a, DG, V), must be at most equal to the
expected utility that the type B firm would get under revelation of his type, defined as
U(lB). Eq. (6) puts an upper bound on the promised payment: no extra premium is paid to
the outsiders should the bad state occur. All the other constraints are as in the program under
perfect information and do not need further explanation.
The problem of the type G firm insiders is, thus, that of revealing their type to the
outsiders without incurring excessive costs. Insiders will, thus, find the optimal combination
of the three instruments mentioned above to signal their type. Therefore, the solution to this
program gives the percentage of the equity retained, the price of the equity and the value of
the put option that ensure that the market will perceive the type G firm as a good firm
(separation).
As mentioned above, we will solve the problem step by step, assuming that the type G
firm can use only the percentage of equity retained, the percentage of equity retained and
the price for the equity and, finally, assuming that the firm can mix the three instruments.
Definition. Define aF = 1 k/lG as the maximum amount of equity that the entrepreneur
of the type G firm has to retain at the full information value lG in order to finance the cost
of the project k.
Lemma 1 (Signaling with a). If the firm can use only the percentage of equity retained a,
then the maximization problem of the type G firm does not have any solution a*(a) if
a*(a)>aF.
As shown in Leland and Pyle (1977), retaining part of the equity is costly for the
entrepreneur. We know that under full information, the optimal amount of equity retained is
zero. Under asymmetric information, however, with V=VG(a, DG) and DG = 0, setting a
equal to zero is not incentive compatible. Given that signaling is more costly for a type B
firm than for a type G firm, there is a level of a such that the bad firm will prefer to reveal
itself as it is rather than mimic the type G firm.
Fig. 1 makes the intuition clear. Because underpricing is not a choice variable in this
simplified version of the problem, the solution, if any, must lie on the downward sloping
line VG(a). The type B firm, by directly (and credibly) revealing itself as a bad firm, can
        
                 
Fig. 1. When the only instrument available to the entrepreneur is the percentage of equity retained, the solution
must lie on the downward sloping line V G(a), and the only candidate equilibrium will be given by P, the
intersection of the indifference curve of the type B firm valued at the reservation utility U(lB) and V
G(a). If the
financial constraint is not met, then no separating equilibrium will prevail. When underpricing is part of the
possible signaling instrument, then the solution can be found in the shaded area. If the risk parameter of the type
G firm is low enough, the solution will be given by PV, the intersection of the financial constraint and the
indifference curve of the type B firm evaluated at its reservation utility. As the variance of the returns gets higher,
the insider of the type G firm will prefer to trade off the percentage of equity retained for the value of the package
sold and the equilibrium point will move along the indifference curve, to the left of PV.
S. Cantale, A. Russino / Journal of Corporate Finance 10 (2004) 753–775 759get utility U(lB). Therefore, any attempt made by the type G firm to signal its type will be
such as to give the mimicking type B firm a level of expected utility smaller or, at most,
equal to its default utility, that is U(lB). It is easy to see in Fig. 1 that for any aa[0,a*(a)),
the incentive compatibility constraint is not satisfied. That is, in this region, separation is
not attained because the type B firm, by mimicking the strategy of the type G firm, will
attain a higher level of expected utility with respect to the level U(lB).With aa(a*(a),1],
the type G firm will also separate, but the costs incurred for separating will be high and
separation may not be a desirable strategy. The only candidate point at which separation
occurs and the signaling costs are minimized is given in the picture by a*(a). As shown in
the proof, the point is unique, and it is represented in Fig. 1 by the intersection of the
indifference curve of the type B firm, valued at U(lB) and the downward-sloping line
VG(a) (point P in the figure). When (1 a*(a))lG < k, the type G entrepreneur has to sell a
higher stake of the firm to make the investment feasible. With a < a*(a), however, type B
firms will have an incentive to mimic the behavior of the type G firms rather than to follow
their equilibrium strategies. Thus, no separating equilibrium will prevail.
From now on, we assume that the minimum proportion of the equity that has to be sold at
the IPO stage is higher than 1 a*(a).
Assumption. a*(a)>aF.
In this case, the type G entrepreneur has to find some instruments other than the
percentage of equity retained to signal the quality of his project to outsider investors.
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of the equity V. Thus, for the remaining of this section, assume that DG = 0.
Lemma 2 (Signaling with a and V). If the firm can use both the percentage of the equity
retained and the price of the package V, when rG< rG*, where rG* is defined in the proof,
the equilibrium strategies of the type G firm involve:
(a) Retaining the minimum amount of equity compatible with separation, that is
a*(a,V) = aV.
(b) Underpricing the equity.
Unlike the case in which the only signal available is the percentage of the equity
retained, now the entrepreneur can choose underpricing as part of the efficient signaling
mix. Thus, as shown in Fig. 1, the solution does not have to lie on the downward straight
line VG(a), but rather in the shaded area. The optimal solution will be the locus of points
in (lB,aV). When rGz rG*, the solution, the tangency point of the indifference curve of the
type B firm calculated at U(lB) and the indifference curve of the type G will be in (lB,aV)
(point P1 in Fig. 1). As the risk parameter of the type G firm increases, the relative cost of
signaling with the percentage of equity retained increases for a risk-averse entrepreneur.
The reason is that by having a higher stake in the company, the entrepreneur will bear
more of the risk coming from the variability of the payoffs. Thus, he will voluntarily
decide to increase the underpricing while retaining a lower stake in the company. On the
other hand, as long as the risk parameter of the type G firm decreases, the type G firm will
be willing to ride the indifference curve of the type B firm from the left to the right,
trading off underpricing with the stake retained in the firm. This process will stop at aV
defined in the proof as the minimum amount of a such that: (a) the financial constraint is
satisfied and (b) separation is still possible (point PV in Fig. 1).
5 In fact, any point to the
right of aV, such as point P2 in Fig. 1, will be such as to ensure separation, but the total
proceeds of the IPO will not be enough to finance the cost of the investment k, and any
other point P3, even if financially feasible, will not be compatible with separation. When a
financial constraint is introduced, firms with a relative lower level of risk will also find it
necessary to underprice to credibly convey information to the outsiders.4. An equilibrium with put options
This section tackles the more general problem faced by the entrepreneur who can use as
signalling devices not only the percentage of equity retained and the price of the equity,
but also a put option-like claim attached to the percentage of equity sold. The option,
modeled here as a lump sum, will insure uninformed outsiders against the occurrence of a
bad state.5 Notice that since aF < a*(a), then aV exists. Graphically, aV is given by the intersection of the financial
constraint with the downward sloping indifference curve of the type B firm valued at U(lB).
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L ¼ UGða;DG;V Þ þ k1ðUðlBÞ  UBða;DG;V ÞÞ þ k2ðVGða;DGÞ  V Þ
þ k3ðaðlG  rG=pLÞ  ð1 aÞDGÞ þ k4ðrG=pL  DGÞ þ k5ðV  kÞ
þ k6ð1 aÞ
with az 0, DGz 0 and Vz 0.
The Kuhn–Tucker conditions for the optimum are given below, where subscripts for L,
U and V denote partial derivatives (arguments are disregarded for simplicity):
La ¼ UGa  k1UBa þ k2VGa þ k3ðlG  rG=pL þ DGÞ  k6V0
LDG ¼ UGDG  k1UBDG þ k2VGDG  k3ð1 aÞ  k4V0
LV ¼ UGV  k1UBV  k2 þ k5V0
aLa þ DGLDG þ VLV ¼ 0
Lk1 ¼ UðlBÞ  UBz0
Lk2 ¼ VG  Vz0
Lk3 ¼ aðlG  rG=pLÞ  ð1 aÞDGz0
Lk4 ¼ rG=pL  DGz0
Lk5 ¼ V  kz0
Lk6 ¼ 1 az0
k1Lk1 þ k2Lk2 þ k3Lk3 þ k4Lk4 þ k5Lk5 þ k6Lk6 ¼ 0
Vz0; az0; Dz0; kiz0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6:
The solution to the maximization problem can be characterized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 (An equilibrium with put options). If Eq. (5) is not binding at the
optimum, there exists a separating equilibrium for the parameter of the problem. In such a
separating equilibrium, if the risk parameter of the type G firm rG is such that
rGa(rG
a ,rG
V ), defined in the proof, then the equilibrium strategies of the type G firm
involve the following:
(a) The firm issues a package of equity with put options (DG*>0).
(b) The package of equity and put option is priced at the full information value
(V*=VG).
(c) The insider retains a positive fraction of the equity a* such that 0 < a*< aF.
Proposition 2 shows the conditions that have to be satisfied for a firm to efficiently
package equity plus a put option-like claim in an IPO. The importance of the result
relies on the fact that attaching a lump sum to the percentage of the equity sold may
help the entrepreneur solve the asymmetric information problem while setting the price
of the package at the full information value. The main intuition of the result is as
follows. As long as aF < a*(a), optimal separating behavior is not dictated exclusively
by the firm’s risk parameter. In fact, when the signals available to the entrepreneur are
only the percentage of equity retained and the price of the package, if rG < rG*, then all
firms, no matter the value of the risk parameter, will choose point PV in Fig. 1. We
know, in fact, that any a to the right of aV is not compatible with separation. When,
however, DG is part of the signals available, as long as the variability of the returns is
not high, setting the price of the package at the full information value is optimal for a
risk-averse entrepreneur. That is, under this condition, he prefers to sell a relatively low
fraction of the firm at V=VG, rather than to sell a higher stake of the firm at a
discounted price. If the risk parameter is very low (or lower than rG
a ), risk-averse
entrepreneurs will find it advantageous to fix the price of the equity at the full
information value, to sell as much of the equity as needed to make the investment
viable (that is, to retain aF), and to issue a put option-like claim. In this case, the only
relevant motivation pushing the entrepreneur to go public is the need for funds so that
he will sell only that part of the firm that will make it possible to finance the cost of
the investment k. If the risk coming from the project is higher, but lower than rB
V, then
the type G firm insider will find it convenient to reduce his stake in the firm, that is
setting a*< aF, but still maintaining the value of the equity at the full information
value: as rG gets higher, the project will bring additional risk, and the entrepreneur
will be better off reducing the actual stake retained in the firm. When rG>rG
V, the put
option will not be part of the efficient signalling mix anymore. In fact, a higher stake
in the firm means bearing considerable risk coming from the project and, as long as
the variability of returns is higher than rG
V, the entrepreneur will prefer trading off V
for a.
The assumption we made in the proposition for deriving the results was that the
constraint attached to the Lagrangian multiplier k3 is not binding at the optimum,
which in turns implies that the fraction of the cash flows of the company in the bad
state to the insiders will be such as to fully pay the lump sum promised by the
entrepreneur. From Eq. (5), we know that the smaller the value of a, the lower the
admissible values that DG can take. For the problem to be interesting (we want to find
ranges of the variance of the type G firm in which it would change a for D), we
should assume that the equilibrium level DG* is such that constraint (5) is not binding.
This may seem a quite strong assumption, but it is necessary for the problem to be
meaningful. Constraint (5) expresses a basic credibility problem faced by outsiders. It
has been motivated earlier in the paper by limited liability and by the impossibility or
the objective difficulty of attacking the entrepreneur’s wealth in the case of no
payment. There are, however, several ways in which the problem can be solved
successfully. The entrepreneur can write a contract with outsiders that in case of
default, will give outsiders the possibility of recouping the losses on the entrepreneur’s
wealth (i.e. a collateral). Another option is to let the investment bank that takes the
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bank with some contractual arrangement that allows the investment bank to attack the
entrepreneur’s wealth. This contract should be easier to write than one between insiders
and outsiders. Although the model explicitly deals with new equity offerings, the
package described in this paper can also be used in seasoned equity offerings when
insiders of the corporation believe that stocks are undervalued by the market.6 Another
possible application of the device introduced in the paper is in privatization plans.
Perotti and Guney (1993), using data from 12 countries, document that privatizations
tend to be highly discounted fixed price offerings.7 While we present an IPO
framework, the additional instrument introduced in the paper can be used in
privatizations. One example of the described package can be found in the offer that
ENI, an Italian at-that-time state owned firm, made when it decided to go public (Fig.
2). The deal that the company proposed to the investors was a package of common
stocks and standard put options that allowed investors to sell back their stocks to the
firm 1 year later (European puts). The issue price of the stock was fixed at Italian liras
5250. ENI started trading on November 28, 1994 on the Milan Stock Exchange, and
the first day closing price was Italian liras 5250.ENI’s closing prices do not resemble
the average price reaction that most stocks experience in the first days of trading.
Instead of realizing the usual high jump, the ENI stock price held steady for 2 days and
then started fluctuating with the market. Finally, when the option expired, the stock price
was much higher than the strike price, so that investors did not exercise their options. We
are aware that this single observation does not constitute a solid statistical basis to conclude
that the instrument proposed in this paper can actually resolve underpricing, but it does
provide a starting point for further discussion and experimentation. Other state-owned
companies have recently decided to go public in a similar fashion.8 Through the use of the
put, the risk coming from the project shifts from outsider shareholders to the entrepreneur.
Given that the credit risk is a real problem in these deals (even though we claimed above
that the option could be written by the investment bank whose reputation should be known
by the market), it is clear why this instrument has been used by state-governed enterprises:
issues such as government reputation, the possibility of jeopardizing future privatizations,6 In 1985, Gearhart Industries needed to raise a fairly large amount of money during a period when the
market price of its stocks was perceived as low by corporate management (the price was about US$ 10.75 per
share). Gearhart’s investment bank advised the management to issue a package of common stock and put options.
The offering price was set at US$ 15 per share, therefore, allowing the firm to find better financing conditions.
7 Jankinson and Mayer (1988) report that the average underpricing for U.K. privatizations has been even
higher than that for other new equity offerings.
8 The instrument described also resembles the deal offered by Argentaria (Spain) in 1994 when this state-
owned company went public. We believe, however, that the put option-like claim (lump sum), as modeled in the
paper, presents a substantial advantage over the standard put option, especially in privatization processes.
Consider what would happen if the bad state occurred (that is, if the put option expired in-the-money). If the firm
issued a standard put option, outsiders would exercise their option and would put back their stocks. This is an
event that has a cost, not only at the corporate level (the firm would become state-owned again), but also at the
social level because it would hurt the government’s reputation and, consequently, jeopardize future privatization
plans. This unfortunate situation would not occur with the lump sum proposed in the paper.
Fig. 2. The case of ENI.
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the put if necessary.
The use of put options in privatizations can also be justified in a completely different set-
up than the one outlined in this paper. Perotti (1994) presents a theory of privatizations
based on government impossibility to commit to a future policy. The idea of the paper is
that the structure of the offering, that is partial sales (and underpricing), as documented in
the aforementioned literature, can be seen as signals coming from the government to
reassure investors. In fact, by retaining a significant stake in the firm, the government, being
a residual claimant as any other shareholder, will convey credibly its willingness to bear all
the risks and the consequences of its actions. In such a framework, the stake retained in the
firm and the put option are completely interchangeable. Both instruments constrain the
government’s actions and can be used as signals. Additionally, the put options would have
the advantage of reducing underpricing and could help resolve the critique raised by Gale
andStiglitz (1989) regarding the congruence of using the retained part of the equity in a
model without commitment.95. Comparative statics
In this section, we develop some comparative analysis for the general case where the
entrepreneur is free to use the three instruments.9 Gale and Stiglitz (1989) show that underdiversification, as pointed out by Leland and Pyle (1977), may not
convince investors in a model with asymmetric information if the entrepreneur can sell his stake in the secondary
market.
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off point of the variance of the type G firm rG
V gets higher:
(a) as the risk parameter of the type B firm gets higher;
(b) as the difference (lG lB) gets higher;
(c) as the lump sum DG gets higher in the admissible range 0VDGV rG/pL.
Proof. By implicit differentiation of the LHS of Eq. (13). 5
The results are intuitive and deserve little comment. As the risk parameter of the
type B firm gets higher, the stake in the firm that the type G entrepreneur has to
maintain in order to obtain separation gets lower. This in turn implies that the
entrepreneur of the type G firm is less subject to the risk coming from the project,
so he will need a higher risk parameter level to choose underpricing as part of the
signalling mix. The second result of the proposition is along the same lines. As lG gets
higher (or conversely lB gets lower), the advantages of underpricing vanish for the type
G firm. Thus, the type G insider will be willing to underprice his package only for
higher levels of rG.
While parts (a) and (b) of the proposition apply also when the type G firm is
constrained to choose as signals only a and V, the third result is the most important in
this section and is peculiar to the case in which DG is a possible signalling instrument. The
result in the proposition states that as DG grows in the admissible region, the cut-off point
of the risk parameter rV* gets higher. The importance of the result relies on the fact that
when a put option-like claim can be attached to the percentage of equity retained a, then
the range of values for which underpricing is not an optimal choice gets unambiguously
higher. That is, there are some values of the risk parameter of the type G firm for which
attaching DG to the equity helps the entrepreneur to set the price of the equity at the full
information value.
Proposition 4 (Comparative statics on DG*). Keeping all the other variables constant,
the magnitude of the lump sum DG* that has to be attached to the equity retained to allow
separation gets lower as rB gets higher.
Proof. The lump sum DG, as a mean of being a signal, is costly. This implies that the
type G firm will choose the minimum level of DG such that separation occurs. That is,
in equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraint will be satisfied with equality, that
is:
UBða;DG;V Þ  UðlBÞ ¼ 0
Implicit differentiation of the above equation with respect to rB will give the result.5
The intuition is of this result goes as follows: as long as the risk parameter of the type B
firm increases, mimicking the behavior of the type G firm by attaching a put option to the
equity sold becomes more and more expensive for the type B firm. Therefore, the insider of
the type G firm may decrease the lump sum DG and still obtain separation. This translates
S. Cantale, A. Russino / Journal of Corporate Finance 10 (2004) 753–775766also to the statement that fully insuring the outsiders might not be an optimal strategy for the
insiders of the type G firm.6. Conclusions
The optimality of common stocks (and bonds) has been and is still an important
issue in the finance literature. Many authors (e.g., Zender, 1991; Aghion and Bolton,
1992; Dewatripoint and Tirole, 1994; Koskinen, 1997) address the issue of optimal
security design, and show that the aforementioned instruments are indeed optimal
financial instruments under different assumptions and at different moments in the life
of the firm. Determining the optimal set of instruments at the IPO stage, however,
does not seem to have been in the research agenda for scholars in finance, probably
because firms do go public by issuing stocks. Along these lines, another interpretation
of the paper could be that given some asymmetry of information between insiders and
outsiders, stand-alone stocks may not be the optimal instrument. Allen and Gale
(1992) show that in an economy characterized by asymmetry of information on
securities’ characteristics and payoffs (what the authors call product uncertainty), too
much standardization is possible. If this is the case, and both the magnitude and the
pervasiveness of underpricing lead us toward this conclusion, the results of this paper
could be seen as a first attempt to tackle this issue. In fact, the main contribution of
the paper is to show that packaging put option-like claims along with equity may help
the entrepreneur to avoid or to reduce the discount that has been documented in the
IPO market. For this to happen, the risk parameter of the type G firm should be low,
as specified in the paper. The force driving the results is that the marginal cost of the
lump sum DG decreases, the lower the variability of the returns of the firm, so that
firms with relatively lower variances may find it optimal to include the put as part of
the efficient signalling mix.
In this paper, we take the security type as given, and we demonstrate the existence of
a separating equilibrium. Deriving the optimal set of instruments at the IPO stage would
constitute an interesting extension. Additionally, we modeled an economy with risk-
neutral shareholders. In a model, like the one presented here in which two parameters
are unknown (namely, mean and variance), and risk-averse investors, the derivative
security could be validly used as a way of communicating the risk parameter to the
market. An analysis with this perspective would enrich our understanding of the
multisignaling literature and of the possible uses of the derivative securities in corporate
finance.Acknowledgements
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Proof of Lemma 1. In this simplified version of the model, the entrepreneur can use
only the percentage of equity retained as signaling instrument. That is, set DG = 0 and
V=VG(a). A necessary condition for an equilibrium to exist is that the incentive
compatibility constraint must be satisfied with equality, i.e. will be binding. In this
way, the bad firm will be left indifferent between mimicking and revealing itself. That
is:
UB ¼ ðaÞ ¼ UðlBÞ ð8Þ
where
UðlBÞ ¼ expðCðw0 þ lB  kÞÞ
In what follows, we will look for the smallest value of a such that Eq. (8) will be
satisfied with equality. The expected utility for the type B firm under mimicking,
denoted UB(a), can be written as
UBðaÞ ¼ pLexpðCðw0 þ aðlB  rB=pLÞ þ ð1 aÞlG  kÞÞ
 pMexpðCðw0 þ aðlBÞ þ ð1 aÞlG  kÞÞ
 pHexpðCðw0 þ aðlB þ rB=pHÞ þ ð1 aÞlG  kÞÞ
Evaluating UB(a) at a = 0 and 1, we obtain that:
(a) UB(a=0)= exp(C(w0+ lG k))>U(lB) because lG>lB;10
(b) U(lB)>U
B(a=1) because of risk aversion,
where
UBða ¼ 1Þ ¼ pLexpðCðw0 þ lB  rB=pL  kÞÞ  pMexpðCðw0 þ lB  kÞÞ
 pHexpðCðw0 þ lB þ rB=pH  kÞÞ
Because of continuity, there is at least one solution to the problem with a bounded away
from 0 and 1. The uniqueness will be proven by showing that UB(a) is strictly decreasing10 Recall also that with V=VG(a), a= 0 is not incentive compatible.




¼ pLCðlB  rB=pL  lGÞeðCðw0þaðlBrB=pLÞþð1aÞlGkÞÞ
þ pMCðlB  lGÞeðCðw0þaðlBÞþð1aÞlGkÞÞ





¼ pLC2ðlB  rB=pL  lGÞ2eðCðw0þaðlBrB=pLÞþð1aÞlGkÞÞ
þ pMC2ðlB  lGÞ2eðCðw0þalBþð1aÞlGkÞÞ
þ pHC2ðlB þ rB=pH  lGÞ2eðCðw0þaðlBþrB=pLÞþð1aÞlGkÞÞ > 0
We have, thus, shown that Eq. (8) has a solution (because of parts (a) and (b) above
and because of continuity) and that the solution is unique (because UB(a) is strictly
decreasing and convex in a). Because of the definition of aF, when a*(a) is such that
a*(a)z aF, then the project is not feasible. Therefore, there is no solution to this prob-
lem that is at the same time incentive compatible and satisfies the financial con-
straint. 5












Proof of Lemma 2. Set DG = 0. Forming the Lagrangian of the problem (Eqs. (2)–(7)), we
obtain:
L ¼ UGða;V Þ þ k1ðUðlBÞ  UBða;V ÞÞ þ k2ðVGðaÞ  V Þ þ k3ðV  kÞ
þ k4ð1 aÞ
with az 0, Vz 0, kiz 0 and i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
The Kuhn–Tucker conditions for the problem are as follows, where subscripts for L, U
and VG denote partial derivatives:
La ¼ UGa  k1UBa þ k2VBa  k4V0
LV ¼ UGV  k1UBV  k2 þ k3V0
aLa þ VLV ¼ 0
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Lk2 ¼ VG  Vz0
Lk3 ¼ V  kz0
Lk4 ¼ 1 az0
k1Lk1 þ k2Lk2 þ k3Lk3 þ k4Lk4 ¼ 0
with Vz 0, az 0, kiz 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Since k>0, then it follows that aF < 1 (and k4 = 0) and V*>0. Thus, from the Kuhn–
Tucker conditions, we have that LV ¼ 0. Solving LV ¼ 0 for k1, we obtain:
k1 ¼ U
G
V  k2 þ k3
UBV
Define aV as the minimum amount of a such that: (a) the financial constraint is satisfied
and (b) separation is still possible. This cut-off point is given by solving the following
implicit expression:
UBðaV ; kÞ ¼ UðlBÞ
With a*(a,V) = aV, we have that La ¼ 0. Plugging the expression of k1 in La ¼ 0, we


















The RHS of Eq. (9) is greater than or equal to zero because the term in the brackets is
negative. Now, consider the LHS of Eq. (9). While Ua
B/UV
B does not depend on the risk
parameter of the type G firm, the term Ua
G/UV
G (that is the absolute value of the marginal
rate of substitution between V and a for the type G firm) does depend on it. The term Ua
G/
UV
G can be written as follows:
UGa =U
G





pLqGL þ pMqGM þ pH
ð10Þ










ðpLqGL þ pMqGM þ pHÞ
















































ðpLqGL þ pMqGM þ pHÞ2
< 0
where the first inequality follows from qL
Gz 1, the second inequality from the fact that the















We have shown that the derivative of Ua
G/UV
G with respect to rG is negative. Thus, there
exists a value of rG, denoted rG*, such that the LHS of Eq. (9) is equal to zero. Thus,
brGz rG*, Eq. (9) is violated. Then, with rGz rG*, a*(a, V) < aV . Also notice that a*(a, V)
cannot be 0 because at that value no separation occurs. For the same token, with rGV rG*,
then a*(a, V) = aV . Since a*(a)>aF, V*<V
G. 5




¼ pLCðlG  rG=pL þ DGÞexpðCðw˜LGÞÞ þ pMClGexpðCðw˜MG ÞÞ
þ pHCðlG þ rG=pHÞexpðCðw˜HGÞÞ > 0
BUGða;DG;V Þ
BDa
¼ pLCð1 aÞexpðCðw˜LGÞÞ < 0
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BV
¼ pLCexpðCðw˜LGÞÞ þ pMCexpðCðw˜MG ÞÞ
þ pHCexpðCðw˜HGÞÞ > 0
BUBða;DG;V Þ
Ba
¼ pLCðlB  rB=pL þ DGÞexpðCðw˜LBÞÞ þ pMCðlBexpðCðw˜MB ÞÞÞ
þ pHCðlB þ rB=pHÞexpðCðw˜HBÞÞ > 0
BUBða;DG;V Þ
BDG
¼ pLCð1 aÞexpðCðw˜LBÞÞ < 0
BUBða;DG;V Þ
BV
¼ pLCexpðCðw˜LBÞÞ þ pMCexpðCðw˜MB ÞÞ
þ pHCexpðCðw˜HBÞÞ > 0
Also, Va
G = (lG + pLDG)V 0 and VDGG = pL(1 a)z 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. We will prove our statements in four steps. First, we show that
a*>0. Second, we will state which are the conditions that have to be satisfied so that V*=VG
and DG*>0. Third, we will find conditions such that a*< aF. Finally, it will be shown that
there exists a unique DG* such that for DG* = D¯G>0 separation occurs.
Step 1: a*>0.
We know that a*= 1 is not in the solution set as long as k>0. For the same reason, V*>0.
It follows that k6 = 0. Thus, from the Kuhn–Tucker conditions, we have that LV ¼ 0 .
Solving LV ¼ 0 for k1, we obtain:
k1 ¼ U
G
V  k2 þ k5
UBV








þ k2VGa  k5
UBa
UBV
þ k3ðlG  rG=pL þ DGÞV0:
Dividing each member for UV











ðUBa þ VGa UBV Þ  k3









Suppose that a = 0. This in turn implies that DG = 0 (because of the limited liability
constraint) and, therefore, k2 = 0 because the only variable to signal is V and, thus, under
separation, underpricing must occur. In addition, note that at a = 0, V k>0, since the type








V k3 lG  rG=pL
UGV
ð12Þ







¼ lG  lB > 0:
Since lG rG/pL is strictly positive by assumption and UVGz 0, then Eq. (12) is
violated. Thus, a*>0 and La ¼ 0.
Step 2: V*=VG and DG*>0.
Again, V*>0 and LV ¼ 0. Solving LV ¼ 0 for k1, we obtain:
k1 ¼ U
G
V  k2 þ k5
UBV











ðUBa þ VGa UBV Þ  k3









Consider the LHS of Eq. (13). While Ua
B/UV
B is independent of rG, Ua
G/UV
G (that is equal
to the absolute value of the marginal rate of substitution between a and V for the type G




rGð1 qGL Þ þ pLDGqGL
pLqGL þ pMqGM þ pH
: ð14Þ














ðpLqGL þ pMqGM þ pHÞ











ðrGð1 qGL Þ þ pLDGqGL Þ
ðpLqGL þ pMqGM þ pHÞ2
< 0
where the first inequality follows from qL
Gz 1, the second inequality follows from



























Thus, b rG < rG
V, the LHS of Eq. (13) is positive. Noting that Ua
B +Va
GUV
B < 0, then the
only way the RHS of Eq. (13) could be positive is if k2>0, which in turn implies that
VGV*= 0 or V*=VG. Since by assumption, a*(a)>aV, separation is attainable only if
DG*>0.
Step 3: a*< aF.
DG*>0 implies that LDG ¼ 0. Solving this expression for k1 we get:
k1 ¼
UGDG þ k2VGDG  k3ð1 aÞ  k4
UBDG
: ð15Þ


























Assume that DG is such that the constraint attached to the Lagrangian multiplier k3 is not
so large that the constraint is binding. Then k3 = 0, and the RHS of the last equation is
nonpositive. Now, consider the LHS of the last equation. Again, while the absolute value of
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between DG and a for the type B firm does not
depend on rG, the absolute value of the MRS






L þ pMqGM þ pHÞ þ rGð1 qGL Þ þ pLDGqGL
pLð1 aÞqGL
: ð17Þ
Taking the derivative of expression (17) with respect to the risk parameter of the type G














Thus, for all rG>rG
a, Eq. (16) is violated. Thus, a*< aF.
S. Cantale, A. Russino / Journal of Corporate Finance 10 (2004) 753–775774Step 4: DG* = D¯G>0.
The uniqueness of the solution will be proven by showing that the indifference curves
for the type B firm in the space (VG, DG) are strictly concave. Recall that the marginal rate of
substitution between DG and V for the type B firm can be written as follows:
MRSBðV;DGÞ ¼ pLð1 aÞq
B
L
pLqBL þ pMqBM þ pH
: ð18Þ




2qBLðpLqBL þ pMqBM þ pHÞ  p2LCð1 aÞ2qB2L




ðpLqBL þ pMqBM þ pHÞ2
> 0:
This and linearity of VG implies that the intersection is unique. Defining this point as D¯G
ends the proof. 5References
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